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Comments
The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984:
Effect of the Dangerousness
Determination on Pretrial Detention
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that an arrested
person must appear before a federal magistrate for arraignment
without unnecessary delay.' At this initial appearance, the magistrate
must advise the defendant of his or her rights and detain or
conditionally release the defendant on bail or personal recogni-
zance. 2 The magistrate has broad discretion, based on the type of
crime involved and the characteristics of the defendant, to set or
deny bail or impose conditions of release.3
Although the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees a right to be free from excessive bail,4 there is no
I. FED. R. CRm. P. 5(a). Unnecessary delay is determined by the facts and circumstances
of each case. See Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 798 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 951 (1960).
2. FED. R. Cam. P. 5(c) (procedure for offenses not triable by a United States magistrate);
cf. id. 5(b) (procedure for misdemeanors). Personal recognizance is pretrial release based on
the promise of the defendant to appear at trial. BLAcK's LAW DircoNARY 1030 (5th ed. 1979).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (Supp. 11 1984); P. WicE, BA AND rrs REFORM: A NATIONAL
Suvy 13 (1973). The traditional methods by which a defendant may obtain pretrial release
include: (1) Cash bail; (2) the 10% plan whereby 10% of the total ball is paid directly to the
court; (3) property bond in lieu of cash bail; (4) release on conditions; and (5) release on
personal recognizance. Id. at 10-11.
4. "Excessive bail shall not be required . .. ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The inability
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constitutional requirement that every person charged with a crime
be released on bail pending trial.5 Since 1789, Congress has provided
a right to bail in noncapital criminal cases in the federal courts.
6
Nevertheless, courts have traditionally detained defendants who are
likely to flee and defendants who are charged with capital crimes.
7
The rationale behind the detention policy in capital cases is that a
defendant charged with a capital crime has nothing to lose by
fleeing, and therefore no amount of bail will ensure the presence
of the defendant at trial.8 Courts also detain defendants who are
likely to interfere with the jury or witnesses since such interference
disrupts the adjudication process.9 When a defendant is considered
a flight risk or is charged with a serious offense, the judge has
traditionally set bail beyond the resources of the defendant thereby
effectively detaining the defendant before trial. 10
In the early 1960s, public dissatisfaction developed with a bail
system that detained indigent defendants solely because of inability
to post bail. The Bail Reform Act of 196612 addressed this problem
by encouraging courts to either release defendants on their own
of the defendant to post bail does not necessarily mean that the bail is excessive. 2 J. COOK,
CONsTITUTIoNAL RIGHTs OF TH AccUsED § 11.1, at 414-16 (2d ed. 1986); Ex parte Bumette,
35 Cal. App. 2d 358, 360, 95 P.2d 684, 685 (1939); Gusick v. Boles, 233 P.2d 446, 448 (1951).
5. Wagner v. United States, 250 F.2d 804, 805 (1957) (the Constitution provides that
bail shall not be excessive, not that every defendant is entitled to bail); Nail v. Slayton, 353
F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (1972) (neither the eighth nor fourteenth amendment requires that every
defendant be released on bail pending trial); see generally, J. CooK, supra note 4, § 11.1
(general discussion of the right to bail); Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60
GEo. L.J. 1140, 1178-94 (1972) (historical evaluation of constitutionality of pretrial detention);
but see Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82
CoLU.i. L. Rsv. 328, 354 (1982) (suggesting that the eighth amendment be interpreted to
include a right to bail).
6. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§
3141-3150 (Supp. 11 1984)).
7. Note, The Loss of Innocence: Preventive Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of
1984, 22 AM. CRm. L. Ry. 805, 807 (1985); Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 686, 689 (9th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961) (risk of flight justifies denial of bail); Corbo v.
Donahue, 149 A.2d 828, 833 (1959) (most states allow the denial of bail in capital cases).
8. Note, supra note 7, at 807.
9. Id.; see Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d. at 686 (threat to witnesses as grounds for
denial of bail).
10. Sears, The 1984 Bail Reform Act-Update on Preventive Detention, 14 CoLO. LAW.
1985, 1985 (1985). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 prohibits the use of a financial condition
that results in the pretrial detention of a defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (Supp. 11 1984). If
the Act requires a detention hearing, the defendant may still be effectively detained if a high
bail is the only condition that will reasonably ensure appearance of the defendant at trial. See
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD=aN. NEws
3182, 3199.
11. See W. THoMAs, JR., BAiL REsoam IN AmERCA 4-5 (1976).
12. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (repealed by Bail
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984)).
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recognizance 13 or grant defendants a conditional release 14 pending
trial.' 5 The 1966 Act did not, however, allow judges to consider the
future dangerousness of a defendant when making the bail deter-
mination. 1 6
By the 1980s, public concern about the high percentage of crimes
committed by defendants out on bail led to an increased desire to
keep potentially dangerous defendants in jail pending trial. 17 The
Bail Reform Act of 198418 was enacted to address this concern. The
1984 Act departs from the traditional view that the likelihood that
a defendant will appear for trial should be the sole basis for
determining whether to release that defendant pending trial.19 In-
stead, the 1984 Act expressly grants judges the power to consider
the potential dangerousness of the defendant when making bail
decisions. 20 Furthermore, under certain circumstances the defendant
may be detained solely on the basis of dangerousness. 2'
This comment will initially review bail reform in the United States
and the Bail Reform Act of 1966.22 Next, the provisions of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 pertaining to defendants pending trial will be
examined. 23 The congressional intent behind the adoption of the
1984 Act will also be discussed. 2A The judicial application of the
13. See supra note 2 (definition of personal recognizance).
14. If own recognizance release will not reasonably ensure appearance of the defendant
at trial, a judge has discretion to impose conditions of release necessary to secure appearance.
See infra note 53 (conditions of release, 1966 Bail Reform Act), note 65 (conditions of release,
1984 Bail Reform Act).
15. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966) (repealed
1984).
16. See id.
17. S. REp. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3188.
18. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 202-210, 98 Stat. 1976, 1976-1987
(1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (Supp. 11 1984)).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (Supp. 11 1984).
20. Id. § 3142(b). The 1984 Act was based primarily on the Washington, D.C. Bail
Reform Act of 1970 which allows for preventive detention based on dangerousness. W.
THomAs, JR., supra note 11, at 8-9.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. 11 1984) (circumstances under which detention is author-
ized); see id. § 3142(f) (cases giving rise to a detention hearing and required procedures).
22. See infra notes 29-58 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 59-94 and accompanying text. This comment deals exclusively with
title IS United States Code section 3142. This statute provides for the release or detention of
a defendant pending trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (Supp. 11 1984). Other provisions of the 1984
Bail Reform Act address release or detention of a defendant pending sentence or appeal (18
U.S.C. § 3143); release or detention of a material witness (18 U.S.C. § 3144); review and
appeal of a release or detention order (18 U.S.C. § 3145); and penalties for failure to appear,
commission of an offense while on release, and violation of a release condition (18 U.S.C. §§
3146-3148).
24. See infra notes 95-122 and accompanying text.
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1984 Act to crimes of violence and controlled substance violations
will then be discussed. 25 This comment will conclude that federal
courts are applying the 1984 Act too broadly in crimes of violence
and controlled substance cases thereby detaining defendants unnec-
essarily and unconstitutionally. 26 This overbroad application disre-
gards the congressional intent behind the 1984 Act.27 Finally,
proposals for legislative reform will be offered to ensure that
application of the 1984 Act is uniform, fair, and consistent with
legislative intent.
28
BAIL REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Bail Reform Projects
Although bail is not constitutionally required, most courts con-
sider bail fundamental to the American concept of liberty.29 The
traditional purposes of bail are to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at trial, 30 to prevent the punishment of innocent persons,
3'
and to enable accused persons to prepare a defense.32 However,
release on bail was traditionally unavailable to some defendants
because of financial hardship. 33 The inherent inequities of a system
which allows pretrial incarceration of defendants on the basis of
economic disadvantage alone led to a national bail reform movement
in the early 1960s.
34
25. See infra notes 123-89 and accompanying text. This comment will not discuss detention
of defendants based solely on risk of flight or tampering with a juror or witness, or defendants
charged with a capital crime.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See infra notes 190-202 and accompanying text.
29. Sears, supra note 10, at 1986; see, e.g., Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 710 (8th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (it is inherent in the American concept of liberty that
a right to bail shall generally exist); Wansley v. Wilkerson, 263 F. Supp. 54, 57 (W.D. Va,
1967) (while the right to bail is fundamental it is not absolute); United States ex rel. Fink v.
Heyd, 287 F. Supp. 716, 718 (E.D. La. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895 (1969) (citing Wansley
v. Wilkerson, 263 F. Supp. 54, 57).
30. See Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197, 197 (1960).
31. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
32. See Heikkinen v. United States, 208 F.2d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1953).
33. W. THoMAs, JR., supra note 11, at 4-5.
34. Id.; P. WicE, FREmEom FOR SiA 97 (1974).
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In 1961, the Vera Foundation 35 instituted the Manhattan Bail
Project, a three-year pretrial release experiment. 36 The project was
designed to provide information to the courts about the community
ties and risk of flight of individual defendants.37 The courts used
this information to determine whether to grant own recognizance
release to the defendant. 38 The success of the Manhattan Bail
Project 39 led to the development of similar bail projects throughout
the United States.40 In general, a bail project staff member conducts
an interview with the defendant and investigates the defendant's
background, community ties, past criminal record, and the serious-
ness of the current charge. 4' The project staff then predicts the
likelihood that the defendant will appear for trial and reports their
findings to the court.42 If the risk of flight is low, the bail reform
project generally recommends own recognizance release of the de-
fendant. 43 By 1964, Congress became aware of the success of these
bail reform projects and legislation designed to reform bail practices
in the federal courts was introduced in Congress. 44 These bills
culminated in the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1966. 45
B. The Bail Reform Act of 1966
A congressional investigation of bail procedures in the federal
courts uncovered wide variations in bail practices. 46 Some district
courts routinely released a high percentage of defendants on their
35. The Vera Foundation, later known as the Vera Institute of Justice, was created to
finance the Manhattan Bail Project. P. \VIcE supra note 34, at 99.
36. See W. THoms, JR., supra note 11, at 3-6 (discussion of the Manhattan Bail Project).
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. The Manhattan Bail Project released over 2000 defendants on their own recognizance
during the first years of operation and generated a national interest in bail reform. Id. at 6.
40. Id.; see P. WicE, supra note 34, at 98-108 (discussion of bail reform projects). A bail
project is a "program which systematically investigates an arrested defendant, usually employing
a type of standardized fact-finding mechanism, to determine his reliability for release on his
own recognizance." Id. at 99. Bail projects differ widely in procedures, results, and philoso-
phies. See P. WIcE, supra note 3, at 30-52 (examination of bail reform projects in eleven
United States cities).
41. P. VICE, supra note 34, at 99.
42. Id.
43. See id. If the judge releases a defendant before triai on the basis of a recommendation
from a bail reform project, the project is usually responsible for supervising the defendant
before trial. Id.
44. See W. THomAs, JR., supra note 11, at 6.
45. See id. at 6-7.
46. Id. at 161-62.
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own recognizance while other district courts never granted such
releases.4 7 Additionally, some districts detained a high percentage
of indigent defendants merely because these defendants were unable
to post nominal bail.48 The inconsistent release patterns among
federal district courts and the success of bail reform projects in
securing pretrial release of defendants prompted the enactment of
the Bail Reform Act of 1966. 49 The 1966 Act was based on the
premise that own recognizance release should be the preferred
method of release.
5 0
The 1966 Act provides that a person charged with an offense not
punishable by death must be released pending trial on either personal
recognizance or an unsecured bond,5 unless in the judge's discretion
this procedure would not reasonably ensure the appearance of the
accused at trial.5 2 Under the 1966 Act, if a judge determined that
an unsecured release was inadequate to secure appearance of the
defendant as required, several alternative conditions of release could
be imposed.5 3 These conditions were intended to reasonably ensure
appearance of the defendant at trial.
5 4
Despite the congressional goal of requiring uniform release of
defendants who were not flight risks 5 5 commentators criticized the
47. Id. at 162.
48. Id. A study of federal district courts showed that the percentage of defendants unable
to post bail in amounts of five hundred dollars or less ranged from 11 to 78 percent. Id.
49. Id. at 162-63.
50. Id. at 163. The 1966 Act explicitly required own recognizance release of a defendant
unless such release would not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at trial. Pub.
L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966) (repealed 1984). See Lay & De La Hunt, The Bail
Reform Act of 1984: A Discussion, 11 Wm. MrrcHELL L. Ray. 929, 932 (1985) (Congress
incorporated the findings of the Manhattan Bail Project in the 1966 Bail Reform Act by
creating a presumption in favor of own recognizance release).
51. An unsecured bond is a bail bond for which the defendant is fully liable upon failure
to appear in court as required, but which is not secured by any deposit of or lien upon
property. BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 128 (5th ed. 1979).
52. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966) (repealed
1984).
53. Id. One or all of the following conditions are to be utilized in any combination
necessary to reasonably assure appearance:
(1) [PIlace the person in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing
to supervise him;
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the person
during the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount ... ;
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit
of cash in lieu thereof; or
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearance




55. See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214 at 214 (1966).
1440
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1966 Act for encouraging the disproportionate use of high bail to
detain poor defendants.5 6 The 1966 Act was also criticized for failing
to provide appropriate release conditions.57 Opponents of the 1966
Act further claimed the Act was too liberal in allowing pretrial
release because it did not give judges enough flexibility in making
release decisions regarding a defendant who was a serious flight
risk or a danger to the community.58
C. The Bail Reform Act of 1984
Congressional dissatisfaction with the 1966 Act, coupled with
growing public concern about crime committed by bailees, led to
the passage of the Ball Reform Act of 1984. 59 While release of
defendants before trial was the primary purpose of the 1966 Act,
a concern for community safety and the need for preventive
detention 6 distinguishes the 1984 Act. 61 Although judges considered
the potential dangerousness of a defendant when making bail de-
cisions under the 1966 Act, such a consideration was not statutorily
required. 62 The 1984 Act, however, specifically allows consideration
of dangerousness in the bail decision.
63
1. General Provisions
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires a judge to order pretrial
release on personal recognizance or unsecured bond unless the judge




59. S. REp. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3185. See also W. THomAs, JR., supra note 11,
at 8-10 (history of the bail reform movement); Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 50, at 934-36
(discussion of bail reform legislation).
60. Preventive detention is used here to mean pretrial incarceration of a defendant if
release would pose a danger to the community or if the defendant would be likely to commit
crime if released pending trial. See Note, Pretrial Preventive Detention Under the Bail Reform
Act of 1984, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 523, 523 n.2 (1985) (definition of preventive detention);
Editorial Note, Detention for the Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 55 U. CN. L.
REv. 153, 153 n.2 (1986) (definition of preventive detention).
61. See generally Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 50, at 936-37 (discussion and comparison
of the 1966 and 1984 Bail Reform Acts).
62. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3193. Pretrial detention of allegedly dangerous
defendants was achieved by imposing extraordinarily high bail that the defendant could not
meet. Id.; Att'y Gen. Task Force on Violent Crime, Final Report 51 (Aug. 17, 1981).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(h) (Supp. 111 984). A judge must order the release of a defendant
unless release will endanger the safety of any other person or the community. Id.
1441
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determines that such a release would not reasonably ensure appear-
ance or would endanger the safety of any other person or the
community. 64 If a judge determines that such a release would result
in flight or danger to the community, conditional release must be
granted if any combination of conditions will adequately safeguard
these interests.6 5 Thus, the 1984 Act expands the provisions of the
1966 Act by specifying additional conditions of release.6 6 In addi-
tion, the 1984 Act specifically prohibits a judge from imposing a
financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of a defen-
dant.67
64. Id. The judicial officer may issue one of four orders under the Act: (1) release on
personal recognizance or unsecured bond; (2) release on conditions; (3) temporary detention
under section 3142(d); or (4) detention under section 3142(e). Id. § 3142(a).
65. Id. § 3142(c). One or more of the following conditions must be utilized in the least
restrictive combination necessary to reasonably ensure appearance of the defendant at trial
and the safety of the community. The defendant may be required to:
(A) remain in the custody of a designated person who agrees to supervise him . ..
(B) maintain employment, or, if unemployed, actively seek employment;
(C) maintain or commence an educational program;
(D) abide by specified restrictions on his personal associations, place of abode, or
travel;
(E) avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with a potential witness
who may testify concerning the offense;
(F) report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, pretrial services
agency, or other agency;
(G) comply with a specified curfew;
(H) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon;
(I) refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or other
controlled substance ... without a prescription by a licensed medical practitioner;
(J) undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment ... ;
(K) execute an agreement to forfeit upon failing to appear as required, such designated
property ... as is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person as
required...;
(L) execute a bail bond with solvent sureties in such amount as is reasonably
necessary to assure the appearance of the person as required;
(M) return to custody for specified hours following release for employment, school-
ing, or other limited purposes; and
(N) satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance
of the person as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the
community.
Id. § 3142(c)(2). Release of every defendant is subject to the condition that the defendant
refrain from committing any crime during the period of release. Id. § 3142(c)(1).
66. See id. § 3142(c)(2) (conditions of release, 1984 Act). Cf. Bal Reform Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966) (repealed 1984) (conditions of release).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (Supp. 11 1984). The purpose of this provision is to preclude the
sub rosa use of high ball to detain a dangerous defendant. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10,
at 3199. If a judge determines that a high bail is the only conditional release that will
reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant at trial, section 3142(c) does not require
the release of the defendant, but only requires compliance with the detention hearing provisions
of the Act. Id.; see Serr, The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984: The First Wave of Case Law,
39 ARK. L. REv. 169, 200 (1985) (discussion of the use of a financial condition to detain a
defendant before trial).
1442
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2. Detention
The 1984 Bail Reform Act provides that under certain circum-
stances a detention hearing must be held to determine whether any
conditions of release could be imposed to adequately ensure both
the appearance of the defendant at trial and the safety of the
community.6 A detention hearing must be held 69 in any case that
involves: (a) A crime of violence;70 (b) an offense with a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment or death; (c) an offense in violation
of certain controlled substances acts; 71 or (d) any felony committed
after the defendant has previously been convicted of two or more
offenses falling into any of the above categories. 72 A detention
hearing is also required 73 in any case that involves either a serious
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (Supp. 11 1984). The detention hearing must be held immediately
upon the first appearance by the defendant unless a continuance is sought. Id. Except for
good cause, a continuance granted to the defendant must not exceed five days and a continuance
granted to the prosecutor must not exceed three days. Id. See United States v. AI-Azzawy,
768 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1985) (timely hearing and continuance provisions of statute are
to be strictly construed); Note, Granting Prosecutors' Requests for Continuances of Detention
Hearings, 39 STAN. L. REv. 761, 790 (1987) (concluding that the continuance procedures in
the 1984 Act are unconstitutional as written).
69. A detention hearing is required in specified cases upon motion of the prosecutor. 18
U.S.C. § 3142(0(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
70. "Crime of violence" is defined as: (a) an offense that has as an element of the
offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another; or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves
a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used
in the course of committing the offense. Id. § 3156(a)(4).
71. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-886 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (regulating
and enforcing registration of manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of controlled subst-
ances); Controlled Substances Import & Export Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-969 (1982 & Supp. III
1985) (regulating the import and export of controlled substances); Act of September 15, 1980,
§ 1, 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1982) (regulating the manufacture, distribution, or possession of
controlled substances on board vessels). See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(13(1)(C) (Supp. II 1984) (a
detention hearing is required only for offenses with a maximum sentence of 10 years or more).
If the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe a controlled substances
offense has been committed, a rebuttable presumption arises that no condition will reasonably
ensure public safety. Id. § 3142(e).
72. Id. § 3142(0)(1). In a case involving one of these four categories, a rebuttable
presumption arises that no condition will reasonably ensure public safety if the judge finds
that the defendant has been convicted of one of the four offenses within the past five years
and the prior offense was committed while the defendant was on release pending trial. Id. §
3142(e). See generally Comment, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness Under
the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. RE. 225 (1985) (discusses the rebuttable
presumptions and the burdens of proof required and concludes that the use of presumptions
is unconstitutional).
73. A detention hearing is only required upon motion of the prosecuting attorney or the
judge. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) (Supp. I 1984).
1443
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risk that the defendant will flee, or a serious risk that the defendant
will obstruct justice or-interfere with a prospective witness or juror.74
If the court determ ines that no conditions will reasonably ensure
both the appearance of the defendant at trial and the safety of the
community, the judge must order the detention of the defendant
before trial. 75
3. Determination of Dangerousness
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows a judge to consider the
potential dangerousness of a defendant when determining whether
to release or detain the defendant before trial.76 Although the judge
has discretion in determining whether a defendant is dangerous, the
1984 Act specifies factors that the judge must take into considera-
tion. 7 The Act requires a judge to consider the nature and circum-
stances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, and the nature and
seriousness of any potential public danger resulting from pretrial
release. 78 Additionally, a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness
arises in certain cases involving controlled substances and prior
offenses committed while free on bail. 79
When a judge determines that a defendant is potentially danger-
ous, pretrial detention is justified to protect the community. 0 Stud-
ies have indicated, however, that it is difficult to predict accurately
which defendants will commit future crimes."' For example, a 1970
study conducted by the National Bureau of Standards showed that
74. Id. This category reflects case law at the time of the implementation of the 1984 Act
and the existing practice of denying release in such cases. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note
10, at 3204.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. II 1984).
76. Id. § 3142(b).
77. Id.; id. § 3142(g) (factors to be considered).
78. Id. § 3142(g).
79. Id. § 3142(e); see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussion of the rebuttable
presumptions of the 1984 Act).
80. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3188.
81. Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 50, at 943; see, e.g., M. TonoRo, PRETRAL RPxJAsE:
A NAT ONAL EVALUATION OF PRACTicES AN OuTcoa s (1981) (study of release practices in
the United States and frequency of pretrial criminality); J. Locxn, R. PEN, J. RicK, E.
BUNTEN, & G. HFuAR, COmPIATION ArN UsE OF COumCm. COURT DATA IN RELATION TO PRE-
TUAL RELEAsE OF DEFENDANTS: PiLoT STUDY (1970) (study of crime committed by defendants
while on bail and the accuracy of dangerousness predictions); NATIONAL CENTER Fon STATE
CouRTs, AN EvALuAT oN OF PoLicY RELATE: RESEARCH ON THE ErncTwaENss OF PRETRIAL
RELEAsE PRoGRAms (1975) (evaluation of pretrial release systems in the United States).
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the incidence of pretrial crime was approximately 1701o for both
felony and misdemeanor arrests, but only 5% for successive arrests
on serious felony charges. According to the study, little correlatioi
exists between the type of crime for which the defendant was initially
indicted and the severity of the second offense committed by the
defendant while on release pending trial8 3 In addition, most crime
committed by defendants released on bail does not occur in the
immediate post-arrest period. 4 The findings of the National Bureau
of Standards therefore undercut the assumption that there is a high
incidence of crime committed by defendants released on bail before
trial for serious felony offenses. 85
The Harvard Study,8 6 conducted in 1971, confirmed the findings
of the National Bureau of Standards.8 7 Factors often used in dan-
gerousness predictions include the occupational status, educational
background, marital status, drug or alcohol use, and prior criminal
record of the defendant.8 s The Harvard Study concluded that these
factors provide only a 40% chance of accurate prediction of dan-
gerousness. 9 Accordingly, the study found that a defendant arrested
for a violent crime is no more likely to commit a violent crime
while on bail than a defendant arrested for a misdemeanor. 90 This
finding is inconsistent with the assumption underlying the 1984 Act
that only defendants charged with serious felonies will engage in
criminal activity if released. 91
Since both the Harvard Study and the National Bureau of Stan-
dards Study undercut the validity of a judicial determination of
82. Ervin, Foreward: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6
H. v. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 291, 294 (1971).
83. Id.
84. Id. Most rearrests occur between 120 and 240 days following the first arrest. Id. at
295. Preventive detention is generally limited to a 60 or 90 day period following arrest. Id. at
294. Therefore, defendants are being detained when they are not likely to commit crimes. Id.
85. Id. The study shows that detention of dangerous and violent offenders does not
provide adequate assurance that serious bail offenses can be eliminated or reduced. Id.
86. Four Harvard Law School students studied pretrial crime committed by defendants
in Boston, Massachusetts, during six months in 1968. They used principles of pretrial detention
to detemine the number and seriousness of offenses that might have been prevented had
pretrial detention been available to the court. Note, Preventive Detention: An Empirical
Analysis, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 300 (1971) (report and evaluation of the Harvard Study
findings).
87. Id. at 317-32.
88. See id. at 310.
89. Id. at 325-27.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 327.
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dangerousness, preventive detention statutes should be reevaluated. 92
The low correlation between the factors used to determine the
dangerousness of a defendant, and the actual probability of recid-
ivism while released on bail, results in the unwarranted detention
of defendants pending trial. 93 Consequently, the procedures for
predicting dangerousness under the 1984 Act have been criticized. 94
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT BEHIND THE
BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
The main legislative purposes of the 1984 Bail Reform Act are:
(1) to allow judges to consider community safety in setting nonfi-
nancial release conditions; (2) to expand the list of statutory release
conditions; and (3) to permit preventive detention of dangerous
defendants. 95 According to the congressional record, safety of the
community is a primary motivation for allowing a judge to consider
the potential dangerousness of a defendant when setting bail. 96
Additionally, Congress believed that the 1984 Act would be fairer
to defendants since judges could no longer effectively impose pretrial
detention by setting a high bail. 97 Instead, a due process detention
hearing is required. 98 Therefore, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was
designed to safeguard the rights of the accused and to promote
community safety. 99
Congress intended to detain only defendants who constituted the
most serious threats to community safety. 0  The legislative history
focuses on a "small group of particularly dangerous defendants"''
and a "reasonably identifiable" group of defendants who would be
92. See Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 50, at 951.
93. Id.; see also Kastenmeier & Beier, Bail Reform Revisited, 32 FED. B. NEws & J. 82,
83 (1985) (it is likely that up to 40% of all federal defendants will be eligible to have a
detention motion made against them).
94. See Note, supra note 7, at 811-14. Since courts cannot accurately predict which
defendants will commit a crime if released before trial, the detention provisions are unsatis-
factory as a guide to determine dangerousness. Id.
95. Kastenmeir & Beier, supra note 93, at 82.
96. 130 CONG. RPc. S751, 5757 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mattingly).
97. 130 CONG. Rac. 5934, S938 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond);
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3194.
98. 130 CONG. Rc. S934, S938 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
99. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3194.
100. Id. at 3189, 3193.
101. Id. at 3189.
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a risk to community safety if released before trial.10 2 For example,
the 1984 Act sought to implement procedures to ensure that pretrial
detention be imposed in a rational and fair manner. 03 To achieve
this purpose, Congress limited the application of the pretrial deten-
tion provisions of the Act' °4 to violent crimes and major drug
trafficking offenses.
10 5
Congress was afraid that a defendant charged with a violent crime
would commit other violent crimes if released on bail. 0 6 Although
Congress refers to "career criminals' 11 7 and "particularly
dangerous"'0 8 defendants, the method for determining which defen-
dants meet these qualifications is not clearly indicated in the 1984
Act. 109 Congress intended, however, that "crimes of violence" be
interpreted to include more than offenses involving physical vio-
lence. 10 Congress specified that the 1984 Act also applies to a
defendant charged with a nonphysical offense such as corrupting a
union"' or continuing to engage in drug trafficking since these
activities constitute a harm to the community." 2 Congress did not
identify the specific dangers to be controlled by preventive detention
and did not establish specific guidelines for determining the appro-
priateness of pretrial detention."' Therefore, courts are forced to
interpret the boundaries of the 1984 Act.
102. Id. at 3193; 130 CoNG. Rac. S934, S942 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (letter from Assistant
Attorney General to Committee on Judiciary (detention is appropriate for only a small
minority of federal defendants).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (Supp. 11 1984) (offenses subject to a detention hearing and
procedural requirements for the hearing).
104. Id.
105. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3203; 130 CONG. REc. S934, S938 (daily ed. Feb.
3, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("[The Ball Reform Act] will send a clear message to
career criminals and drug traffickers . .. ."); id. at S941 (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (the
Act applies to the most serious crimes and complex drug trafficking cases); see 18 U.S.C. §
3142(f)(I)(A)-(D) (Supp. 11 1984) (crimes triggering a detention hearing under the 1984 Act).
106. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3195.
107. 130 CONG. REc. S934, S938 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
108. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3193.
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (Supp. 11 1984) (factors to be considered in the detention
decision); see also supra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (problems of predicting future
dangerousness).
110. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3195.
111. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 1979). The Provenzano
court held that corrupting a union constituted a crime of violence within the meaning of the
1984 Act. Id.
112. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3195-96; 130 CONG. REc. S751, 5757 (daily ed.
Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Sen. Laxalt) (continued acts of theft might also be included in the
concept of danger).
113. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3195-96.
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Drug offenses which involve trafficking in large amounts of
controlled substances give rise to a presumption of dangerousness
under the 1984 Act.114 Congress defined these offenses as "serious
and dangerous" federal crimes because drug traffickers are fre-
quently persons with criminal records who are therefore likely to
engage in continued serious drug-related or violent crimes.' 5 Con-
gress reasoned that a defendant charged with a serious drug traf-
ficking crime is often a drug "kingpin" who is in the business of
importing or distributing dangerous drugs and is likely to commit
similar drug offenses while released on bail." 6
Congress further observed that the risk of flight to avoid prose-
cution is particularly high when the defendant is charged with a
major drug offense." 7 The lucrative nature of the drug trade enables
the trafficker to post millions of dollars in bail with no incentive
to appear at trial since the bail is considered an incidental cost of
doing business. 18 Additionally, since most major drug traffickers
have substantial ties outside the United States, flight to avoid
prosecution is relatively easy." 9
Notwithstanding the preventive detention procedures of the 1984
Act, pretrial release is still favored by the Act.2 ° Release is required
if conditions can be imposed that are adequate to ensure appearance
of the defendant at trial and to protect the community.' 2' Clearly,
Congress intended preventive detention to serve as an exceptional
remedy to be employed only in a limited number of cases, and only
if no method of pretrial release would adequately serve societal
interests. 12
APPLICATION OF Tm BAIL REFOR ACT OF 1984
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C) (Supp. 111984) (drug offenses subject to a detention hearing
under the 1984 Act); id. § 3142(e) (rebuttable presumption of dangerousness).





120. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (Supp. II 1984). See also Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 50, at
952 (Despite the presumptions against release in certain cases, pretrial detention is still the
alternative of last resort).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (Supp. 11 1984).
122. Id.; S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3193; 130 CONo. Rac. S934, S942 (daily ed.
Feb. 3, 1984) (letter from Assistant Attorney General to Committee on Judiciary).
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A. Constitutionality of the Act
1. United States v. Salerno
The federal courts have interpreted various provisions of the 1984
Bail Reform Act inconsistently. Initially, controversy among the
courts focused on the constitutionality of using a prediction of the
future dangerousness of a defendant in a bail decision. 2 3 In United
States v. Salerno, 24 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
facial constitutionality of the 1984 Act. 1' In Salerno two leaders of
the New York City Genovese crime family were detained before
trial. 126 The defendants were charged with various Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, including
racketeering, fraud, extortion, gambling, and conspiracy to commit
murder.127 The lower court ordered pretrial detention on the grounds
that no conditions of release would reasonably ensure community
safety. 128 In the appeal of the detention order, the defendants
claimed that the 1984 Bail Reform Act violated due process because
the Act authorized punishment before trial. 29 In the alternative, the
defendants argued that the Act violated prohibitions against exces-
sive bail. 130 This claim was based on the assertion that the right to
bail rested solely on considerations of flight.'3' The Supreme Court
rejected both arguments and held that the governmental interest in
community safety outweighs the liberty interest of the individual. 3 2
123. Compare United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1004 (2d Cir. 1986) and
United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987)
(pretrial detention based on a prediction of dangerousness violates substantive due process and
is unconstitutional) with United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 766-68 (7th Cir. 1986) (the use
of a dangerousness determination in bail decisions is constitutional).
124. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
125. Id. at 2098.
126. Id. at 2099.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2101. See Editorial Note, supra note 60, at 166-87 (preventive detention is
unconstitutional because it constitutes punishment without an adjudication of guilt).
130. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2104 (1987). See Editorial Note, supra note 60, at 195-98
(the excessive bail clause prohibits unreasonable denials of bail); Meyer, supra note 5, at 1179-
80 (the excessive bail clause does not guarantee a right to bail).
131. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
132. Id. at 2102.
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Since pretrial detention is not intended to punish a dangerous
defendant before trial, the Court held that the due process rights
of the defendants were not violated.' Furthermore, since the 1984
Act serves a legitimate and compelling interest in protecting society,
the eighth amendment does not require release on bail. 3 4 Addition-
ally, the Act focuses narrowly on serious offenders and provides
procedural safeguards to protect the defendant." 5 Therefore, the
Court held that a determination of dangerousness is a valid consid-
eration to be utilized by the courts in bail decisions.'36
2. Procedural Considerations
Although the Salerno Court upheld the facial constitutionality of
the 1984 Bail Reform Act, the Court noted that the possibility of
unconstitutional application of the Act still exists. 3 7 The Court
emphasized the importance of providing adequate procedural safe-
guards before pretrial detention is authorized.'38 Congress also rec-
ognized that the preventive detention provisions of the 1984 Act
require adequate procedural safeguards to meet constitutional stan-
dards. 139
The 1984 Act grants defendants the right to counsel at a detention
hearing and the right to testify and present evidence. 40 In addition,
the judge is required to consider certain factors when making a
detention decision, including the circumstances surrounding the
charged offense and the individual characteristics of the defen-
dant.141 Congress also observed that the 1984 Act might be uncon-
stitutional if applied to cases in which pretrial detention is not
necessary to protect society from a potentially dangerous defen-
dant. 142
133. Id. at 2101.
134. Id. at 2105.
135. Id. at 2103-04.
136. Id. at 2105.
137. Id. at 2100.
138. Id. at 2103-04 (the procedural safeguards are sufficient to withstand a facial attack
but might be insufficient in particular circumstances).
139. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3191.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (Supp. 11 1984). The government's case must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. A judge must provide a written statement of reasons for a
decision to detain. Id. § 3142(i).
141. Id. § 3142(g). Characteristics of the defendant that the court must consider include:
character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, com-
munity ties, past conduct, drug or alcohol abuse, and criminal record. Id. § 3142(g)(3).
142. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3191.
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The procedural requirements of the Act relating to the length of
pretrial detention may be unconstitutional since courts have held
that due process limits the permissible length of pretrial detention.
14
Congress utilized the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act of 19741
44
in the procedures of the Bail Reform Act. 14 The Speedy Trial Act
requires that a trial be held within ninety days of arrest.146 Critics
of the ninety day limit have noted that extensions are easily ob-
tained, and in a complex case pretrial detention can last longer than
a year. 147 In such cases, federal courts have held that due process
requires the release of the defendant from pretrial detention.
48
Therefore, although the 1984 Act is facially valid, pretrial detention
may be unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds if the
detention procedures inadequately protect the liberty rights of the
defendant, or if detention is not required to protect community
safety.
B. Crimes of Violence
As set forth in the 1984 Bail Reform Act, a "crime of violence"
includes an offense against the person or property of another by
physical force, or any felony that involves a substantial risk of
physical force. 49 The legislative history of the Act clearly reveals
that Congress intended to include offenses other than those resulting
in physical harm to persons or property in determining the danger-
ousness of a defendant, 50 As discussed previously, the 1984 Act
143. See United States v. Accetturo, 783 F,2d 382, 388 (3d Cir, 1986) ("at some point due
process may require a release from pretrial detention"); United States v. Vastola, 652 F. Supp.
1446, 1449 (D.N.J. 1987) (defendant conditionally released after three months of pretrial
detention because the trial date was over a year away); United States v. Frisone, 795 F,2d 1,
2 (2d Cir. 1986) (twelve month detention violated the defendant's due process rights).
144. 18 US.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp, IV 1986).
145. See 130 CONG. REc, S934, S939 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (statement of Sen, Mitchell)
(argument for a 60 day limit), Although the 1984 Act contains n1o time limitation for pretrial
detention, the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act limit detention to 90 days. Id.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
147. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest Balancing Ap-
proaches to Due Process, 85 Micra. L. REv. 510, 516 (1986).
148. United States v. Vastola, 652 F. Supp. 1446, 1449 (D.N.J. 1987) (defendant condi-
tionally released after three months of pretrial detention because the trial date was over a year
away); United States v. Frisone, 795 F,2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1986) (twelve month detention violated
the defendant's due process rights).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1984).
150. See supra notes 100-13 and accompanying text (discussion of congressional intent
regarding the scope of dangerousness considerations in detention decisions).
1451
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
failed to expressly delineate the scope of dangerous crimes.'' Com-
mentators suggest that since a "crime of violence" includes the use
of force against persons or property, a broad interpretation of the
1984 Act could conceivably include offenses such as tipping over
garbage cans and shoplifting.15 2 Consequently, critics of the 1984
Act argue that the definition of a "crime of violence" authorizes
detention of defendants charged with minor offenses. 53
In United States v. Yeaplei . 4 the United States District Court held
that possession of child pornography is a crime of violence. 55 The
defendant in Yeaple was charged with receipt of material depicting
minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 15 6 Pursuant to the 1984
Act and after a detention hearing, the defendant was found to be
potentially dangerous to society and ordered detained pending trial.
5 7
According to the court, a person creates a demand for pornography
by purchasing such material, and this demand indirectly causes
minors to be drawn into the pornography trade.'58 Therefore, the
possessor of the pornographic material is indirectly responsible for
the psychological and physical violence inflicted on minors by the
illegal pornography business. 59
Subsequently, United States v. Cocco'60 was decided by the same
district court. The defendant in Cocco was charged with receipt of
child pornograpy.' 61 The defendant had no prior criminal record,
was a good father and husband, a respected businessman and a
substantial property owner. 62 The court nevertheless ordered the
defendant to be detained prior to trial.163 Detention was authorized
by the court on the basis of potential danger to the community
because the court believed that pedophiles often continue their
aberrant conduct even after being indicted for the crime. 64
151. Id.
152. Alschuler, supra note 147, at 512 & n.7.
153. Id.
154. 605 F. Supp. 85 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
155. Id. at 87.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 86.
158. Id. at 87.
159. Id.
160. 604 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
161. Id. at 1061.
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In United States v. Chimurenga65 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the detention order of a defendant charged
with conspiracy to commit armed robbery. 166 The court reasoned
that conspiracy constitutes a crime of violence because armed rob-
bery, the underlying crime committed by the conspirators, is a crime
of violence. 16 7 The definition of crime of violence provided in the
1984 Act, however, does not specify that a judge may consider the
object crime of the conspiracy when determining whether a crime
is violent and a literal reading of the definition precludes such a
consideration. 1
68
In United States v. Jones'69 a federal district court held that a
felon in possession of a firearm is subject to pretrial detention
under the 1984 Act. 170 The court found that possession of a firearm
is a crime of violence.' 71 Rather than considering the individual
characteristics of the defendant, the court justified the detention
order by relying on the presumption that felons, as a class, are
likely to use firearms irresponsibly. 72 The Jones court held that
possession of a firearm evidences disregard for the law since the
defendant knows such possession is prohibited. 73 Thus, the court
found the defendant to be a substantial risk to society and detained
him pending trial. 74 A logical extension of the Jones decision is
that all ex-felons possessing firearms should be detained prior to
trial for subsequent offenses. Such a class is clearly not the target
of the preventive detention provisions of the 1984 Act.
Preventive detention has also been invoked in cases involving
credit card fraud and money laundering on the grounds of economic
danger to the community.' 75 As with the previously discussed of-
165. 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985).
166. Id. at 406.
167. Id. at 404.
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1984); Serr, supra note 67, at 177.
169. 651 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
170. Id. at 1310.
171. Id. The court based its finding on the definition of crime 'of violence in the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 and stated that if the definition was not contained in the Act it would
have found the crime non-violent since possession in itself cannot be violent. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. ("many defendants can fairly be classed as outlaws").
174. Id.
175. Nat'l L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 33, col. 2 (unpublished detention orders filed in the
Northern District Court of Texas). Cf. United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir.
1986) (fraudulent identification crimes are not the type of danger to the community that will
support a detention order); United States v. Lepere, 599 F. Supp. 1322, 1325 n.4 (D.C. Mass.
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fenses, these cases do not comport with the congressional intent
that only the most violent and dangerous defendants should be
detained before trial.176 The purpose of the 1984 Act is to protect
the community from career criminals and major drug traffickers.
177
A defendant without a criminal record, charged with either posses-
sion of pornographic material, credit card fraud, or conspiracy, is
clearly not the intended target of pretrial detention. Therefore, some
federal courts are applying the 1984 Act beyond the scope of
congressional intent and detaining defendants unlawfully.
C. Controlled Substance Violations
Although Congress intended to target major drug traffickers as
candidates for preventive detention, 78 critics argue that this focus
has resulted in the detention of every defendant charged with illegal
narcotics dealings 79 First time offenders and defendants charged
with relatively minor drug offenses have been detained under the
1984 Act.180 The Act provides that when a judge finds probable
cause to believe that a defendant committed one of the controlled
substance offenses specified in the Act, a rebuttable presumption
arises that no conditions of release will be sufficient to protect
society.1 81 The federal district courts disagree on the strength of the
rebuttable presumption and the evidence required to rebut the
presumption.8 2 As a result, preventive detention is being inconsis-
tently applied in the federal courts.183
For example, in United States v. Diaz'8 4 the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit upheld the rebuttable presumption of dan-
1984) (presence of loaded guns in defendant's home was insufficient to establish risk to tile
community).
176. See supra notes 95-122 and accompanying text (discussion of congressional intent
behind the 1984 Bail Reform Act).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMoRY L.J. 686, 740 (1985).
180. See Nat'l L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 33, col. 2 (statement of Judy C. Clarke, Chief
Federal Public Defender in San Diego). Border arrests involving "first-time offenders bringing
90 or 100 pounds of marijuana over the border ... for someone else" often result in pretrial
detention. Id. Since the detention decision is made at a preliminary proceeding in the district
court, most detention orders are unpublished. Therefore, citations to specific cases are una-
vailable.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. If 1984).
182. See Berg, supra note 180, at 725.
183. Id.
184. 777 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1985).
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gerousness even though the defendant proved substantial ties to the
community and had no prior criminal record. 18 5 In United States v.
Dominguez,18 6 however, the same court conditionally released a
similarly situated defendant who had community ties and no crim-
inal record. 87 Even if the presumption of dangerousness was not
rebutted, the Dominguez court held that the defendant could not
be detained unless the judge explicitly found that no conditions of
release would ensure community safety.' 8 Furthermore, the Dom-
inguez court concluded that a finding of dangerousness could not
rest solely on the presumption of dangerousness, unless clear and
convincing evidence demonstrated that the defendant truly was
dangerous.189 The Diaz and Dominguez decisions demonstrate the
inconsistency of the courts in applying the provisions of the 1984
Act.
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
OF THE 1984 BAn. REFORM ACT
Congress attempted to make the Bail Reform Act of 1984 clear
and unambiguous with regard to the requirements for preventive
detention.'90 Nevertheless, courts have inconsistently applied the
Act.' 9' Some federal courts interpret the Act narrowly and impose
preventive detention less frequently, while other federal courts in-
terpret the Act broadly and detain a wide range of defendants.' 92
The 1984 Act is used to detain defendants not targeted by the
Act. 93 The Act should therefore be amended to ensure that all
defendants will be treated consistently throughout the federal courts,
and that the rights of each defendant will be protected.
185. Id. at 1238. Cf. United States v. Olavarria, Crim. No. 86-00262-02 (E.D. Pa. July
16, 1986) (WESTLAW: 1986 WL 8123). The defendant, charged with a controlled substance
violation, was detained before trial even though the government offered no evidence that he
was a threat to the community. Id. Detention was based solely on the rebuttable presumption
of dangerousness. Id.
186. 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986).
187. Id. at 707.
188. Id. (past danger is not conclusive except to the extent that it suggests the likelihood
of future danger).
189. Id.
190. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3187-89.
191. See supra notes 149-89 and accompanying text (judicial application of the 1984 Bail
Reform Act).
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 95-122 and accompanying text (congressional intent behind the 1984
Act); Nat'l L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
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Congress should specify which crimes are to be included in the
category of crimes of violence. 194 Delineation of the crimes of
violence covered by the Act would ensure that defendants are treated
consistently. Consistent application of the Act also requires the
amendment of the controlled substance provisions of the Act.
Congress should increase procedural safeguards to protect defen-
dants who are not categorized as major drug traffickers. 19
Both the United States Supreme Court and Congress recognize
that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 might be applied unconstitutionally
if procedural safeguards are not adequate to protect the rights of
the defendant. 196 As previously discussed, due process requires limits
on the length of permissible pretrial detention. 197 Therefore, Con-
gress should amend the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and set a limit
on the length of pretrial detention.'98 In addition, a provision of
the Act requiring accelerated trials should be enacted. 99 Statistics
indicate that most crimes committed by bailees are committed more
than three months after the initial arrest. 2°° Therefore, an accelerated
trial requirement would protect both the due process rights of the
accused and the interests of society to be protected from pretrial
crime. 20
CONCLUSION
The problem of crimes being committed by defendants released
on bail led to the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The
Act allows judges to consider the harm that might result from
pretrial release of a defendant. 2° Additionally, the Act provides a
system whereby a defendant, in limited circumstances, may be
detained prior to trial.20 3
194. See supra notes 149-78 and accompanying text (discussion of crimes of violence).
195. See Nat'l L. J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 32, col. 2.
196. See United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103-04 (1987); S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 10, at 3191.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1986) ("at some
point due process may require a release from pretrial detention").
198. See Alschuler, supra note 147, at 516.
199. See Note, supra note 86, at 359 (expedited trials as an alternative for reducing bail
crime); Schlesinger, Bail Reform: Protecting the Community and the Accused, 9 HARv. J.L.
& PuB. PoL'y 173, 199 (1986) (speedy trials should be required).
200. Ervin, supra note 82, at 295.
201. See Note, supra note 86, at 359-62.
202. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
203. Id. § 3142(e).
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The constitutional rights of criminal defendants should not be
overlooked in an attempt to detain "dangerous" defendants. The
1984 Act contains procedural guarantees designed to safeguard the
personal rights of the defendant. 20 4 The application of these pro-
cedures, however, has not been uniform. A goal of the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 is to make the application of the bail laws consistent
and fair for all defendants. 20 5 Since the detention procedures of the
Act are being inconsistently applied, the goals of fairness are not
being achieved.
The current judicial system detains defendants unnecessarily. Leg-
islative reform is therefore required to clarify congressional intent.
Societal goals of controlling crime committed by defendants while
released on bail can be achieved by limiting application of the Act
to serious criminal offenders. Such a limitation would also protect
the fundamental rights of the accused.
JoAnn M. Arkfeld
204. Id. § 3142(f)-(g).
205. See S. RE-P. No. 225, supra note 10, at 3193-94.
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